Finding Safety in a Painful Exodus
Hurricane Katrina is officially the most costly hurricane in
all of American history. In terms of dollars, there may be as much as $200
billion dollars in damage. More importantly, the official death toll is over
one thousand dead. Combined with hurricane Rita hitting Texas,
the Gulf Coast
is a mess.
The primary response now must be to help those affected and displaced by these
hurricanes. However, it is also important to think towards the future and
figure out how best to improve disaster responses so that when hurricanes
strike again victims receive better aid. Areas in Texas,
Mississippi, Alabama,
and Louisiana were all struck,
but New Orleans is a focus point for
disaster response analysis both because it was struck so hard and because the
response was clearly not enough.
On August 25, Katrina first hit land near Miami
as a relatively weak category 1 storm. It soon gained strength and did
substantial damage to both Mississippi
and Louisiana on August 29 as a
category 4 storm. New Orleans
suffered especially because the levee system that usually protected the below
sea level city broke at multiple points causing massive flooding. Although the
mayor ordered mandatory evacuations the day before the storm struck the city,
many people did not get out of the city in time. Many more were left without
anywhere to go and became refugees in football stadiums. Lawlessness became so
bad that Michael Brown, the head of Federal Emergency Management Agency at the
time, described the rescue operations as being “under conditions of urban
warfare.”
These problems resulted in massive political fallout. President Bush’s approval
ratings dropped, and he made a statement taking some of the responsibility.
Michael Brown was stripped of his disaster relief responsibilities and soon
resigned. Now New Orleans’ police
chief has even resigned. Politicians have also begun official investigations.
But the only results have been apportionments of blame. It is clear that the
government must undergo substantial structural changes in addition to the few
personnel changes that have already occurred.
The biggest problem is that no one is sure who was actually responsible for the
disaster relief. The local and state governments say they did not receive the
federal assistance that was necessary. The federal government through FEMA has
laid the blame on the local and state governments. Indicative of these
responses is Brown’s congressional testimony. Brown maintained that “FEMA did a
good job in the Gulf States.” He
also squarely laid the blame elsewhere, saying, “My biggest mistake was not
recognizing, by Saturday (before the storm made landfall), that Louisiana
was dysfunctional.”
In order to avoid such counter-productive blame games in the future, there must
be a clear understanding of who is actually in charge. Right now FEMA can help
coordinate the response but cannot overrule local decisions, while those local
decisions cannot be effective without federal support. Since the worst
emergencies easily overwhelm local governments, the federal government must be
the one to take charge.
However, such a change would mean a substantial shift in the balance of power
between states and the federal government. For example, the Posse Comitatus Act
of 1878 prevents military personnel from doing police work except under certain
circumstances. In the case of New Orleans’
lawlessness, it would have been useful for the military to have been able to
immediately fill such a role. Not only was New Orleans’
police force inadequate for such a disaster, but 250 officers never showed up.
At the very least the government will hire a new FEMA chief and budget more
money for future natural disasters, but these changes - while necessary- are only
the beginning. There needs to be national debate on federalism that results in
substantial changes in the federal government’s powers over local and state
governments. While these changes would have much broader effects than just
hurricane response, New Orleans is
proof that the status quo will only lead to future failure.
Aaron Barnet is a sophmore in Trumbull College and Senior Editor of The Yale Free Press.
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